












E–stability and stability of









ISSN 1860–5580E–stability and stability of adaptive learning in




The paper demonstrates how the E–stability principle introduced by
Evans and Honkapohja [2001] can be applied to models with heterogeneous
and private information in order to assess the stability of rational expectations
equilibria under learning. The paper extends already known stability results
for the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] model to a more general case with
many differentially informed agents and to the case where information is
endogenously acquired by optimizing agents. In both cases it turns out that
the rational expectations equilibrium of the model is inherently E-stable and
thus locally stable under recursive least squares learning.
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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the standard tools that are used
to analyze the stability of adaptive learning processes, can be utilized within the
context of models with private and heterogeneous information. This approach
tracing back to Marcet and Sargent [1988] and comprehensively described by
Evans and Honkapohja [2001] is based upon the approximation of the limiting be-
havior of the learning process by an ordinary differential equation. The dynamic
properties of this differential equation can then be analyzed with the help of the so
called T–map, which gives rise to an E–stability principle (cf. Evans and Honkapohja
[2001] for a thorough discussion): According to that principle, a rational expec-
tations equilibrium is locally stable under adaptive learning, if and only if it is E–
stable. Here and in the next sections it will be demonstrated that this E–stability
principle remains valid within the framework of models with private and heteroge-
neous information and even if the amount of private information is endogenously
determined.
The validity of the E–stability principle simpliﬁes the analysis of adaptive learn-
ing processes in models with heterogeneous and private information considerably.
This will be shown by ﬁrst looking at a simple linear economic model whose main
purpose is to introduce the underlying concept. By the way, however, it is demon-
strated that the introduction of private information into a model with adaptively
learning agents is not harmful to the convergence of the learning process towards
the rational expectations equilibrium. The reason is that E–stability is governed by
more fundamental properties of the model, which are unaffected by the presence of
private information or other sources of learning heterogeneity.
In economic situations where agents have incomplete private information re-
garding payoff relevant aspects, market prices besides their allocative function
also fulﬁll an informational function. A famous model highlighting the informa-
tional role of prices is the ﬁnancial market model by Grossman and Stiglitz [1980],
where agents try to extract from market prices the information of others — and
thus are ‘learning’ from prices. In order to show how the E–stability principle
can be used to answer the question whether agents can learn to extract infor-
mation of others correctly from market prices in an adaptive fashion, a variant
of the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] model is analyzed. While the properties of
the Grossman and Stiglitz model under learning have already been studied by Bray
[1982], Marcet and Sargent [1992] and — from a somewhat different perspective
— Routledge [1999], the reexamination of this model demonstrates how the stabil-
ity results derived in that papers can be reproduced quite easily using the E–stability
principle. Furthermore, this approach allows to generalize these results in two im-
portant directions. First, it will be shown that the rational expectations equilibrium
in a model of the Grossman and Stiglitz type with an exogenously given amount of
2private information is always E–stable, irrespectively of the number of differentially
informed agents. Second, it will be shown that E–stability continues to hold if the
amount of private information is endogenously determined, i.e. if optimizing agents
decide how much costly private information they want to acquire.
2 Learning and private information: A simple model
The model that is used here is a simple linear model — reminiscent of the well
known cobweb model — with n economic agents where an endogenous variable y
is a linear function of individual actions ai, i = 1,...,n and an unobserved variable












Agents possess private information regarding x, because every agent observes a
private signal si = x+ui, where ui represents the noise associated with the signal.
Regarding this noise it is assumed that E[ui] = 0 and Var[ui] = s2
u for all i = 1,...,n.




u denoting the signal to noise ratio of the private signals,











We assume that individual actions are each a linear function of the conditional
expectation of the endogenous variable y given the respective private signal:
ai = d E[y|si], i = 1,...,n (2)
2.1 Rational expectations equilibrium and the T–map
To compute the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of this model we assume
that agents use linear decision rules, implying that the expectation of y conditional
on si is a linear function of the private signal si
ai = d (g0,i +g1,isi)
      
=E[y|si]
(3)
The yet undetermined coefﬁcients g0,i and g1,i in (3) now have to be determined
for all i = 1,...,n such that the respective expectation coincides with the true condi-
tional expectation of y.
Under the assumption of such linear decision rules the endogenous variable is










3Here ¯ g0 = (1/n)ån g0,i and (1/n)¯ g1 = ån g1,i denote the averages of all individ-
ual coefﬁcients. With the conditional expectation of y based on equation (4), the
updated decision rule for an agent i is now given by:







= d [b0+db1¯ g0]












With gi = (g0,i,g1,i)′ for i = 1,...,n denoting the vector of individual coefﬁcients,
equation (5) can be used to construct a mapping from the vector g = (g1,...,gn) of
individual coefﬁcients to the updated coefﬁcient g′
i of an agent i:
g′
i = Ti(g) = Ti(g1,...,gn), i = 1,...,n (6)
This mapping is the individual T–map which can be used to construct the overall
T–map g′ = T(g):










As usual, the REE — in the present case a limited information REE — is a ﬁxed
point of this mapping. In such a REE individual coefﬁcients are identical, i.e. gi = g∗
for all i = 1,...,n. Using equation (5) we get:















2.2 E–stability and stability under learning
Local stability of this REE under adaptive learning — which in the present context
means learning using recursive least squares or a stochastic gradient procedure —
can now be quite easily analyzed using the T–map. First of all it is, however, neces-
sary to embed the hitherto static model into a dynamic framework such it is at all
possible to analyze real time learning processes. Thus, from now on it is assumed
that the just described static model is repeated over a long horizon. In each period t,
an unobserved random variable xt realizes and agents observe their private signals
si,t = xt +ui,t. Individual actions as before depend on an expectation regarding the




4where gi,t is a 2×1 vector of individual coefﬁcients and z′
i,t = (1,si,t). At the end of
every period, agents then revise their estimate gi,t in the light of new data, consisting
of the endogenous variable yt and their private signal si,t. This recursive estimation
is done using either recursive least squares or a stochastic gradient procedure, the
asymptotic properties of which are identical in the present context.
As is well known, local stability of such an adaptive learning process is governed
by E–stability conditions (this is the so called E–stability principle formulated by
Evans and Honkapohja [2001]). According to this, local stability of the rational
expectations equilibrium g∗ under learning obtains whenever g∗ is a locally stable
stationary point of the 2n dimensional ordinary differential equation(see Appendix
A.1 for a derivation of equation (7)):
˙ g = T(g)−g (7)
Local stability therefore requires that all eigenvalues of the 2n×2n matrix J(g∗) of
partial derivatives of the map T(g)−g with respect to g evaluated at g∗ are negative.








= A, i = 1,...,n, j  = i



















Since A and B are diagonal matrices, 2(n−1) of the n eigenvalues of T′(g∗) are
given as repetitions of the eigenvalues of B, while the remaining two eigenvalues


















Stability of the REE under learning requires that all eigenvalues are smaller than
one. Since n≥1 and p>0, a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for stability therefore
is that db1 < 1 . This is exactly the condition that determines local stability of the
REE under learning in case of homogeneous ﬁrms under full information, i.e. the
case where xt is observed.
In the cobweb model — or more generally, in all models that are character-
ized by strategic substitutability of individual actions —, we have db1 < 0 such that
5this stability condition is always satisﬁed (see Guesnerie [2005] for a discussion of
strategic substitutability and complementarity in the context of learning). It may
also be satisﬁed in models, where strategic complementarity of individual actions
as measured by the product db1 is sufﬁciently small. Irrespective of this, however,
heterogeneity of information will lead to no additional conditions for the stability of
adaptive learning processes. As long as the stability condition for the homogeneous
case (i.e. db1 < 1) is satisﬁed, stability also obtains for the case where differentially
informed agents learn using recursive least squares.
3 A competitive market model with learning from prices
In the model considered so far, the only information of agents regarding the un-
observed variable xt consists of privately observed signals si,t. This leaves open
the question how this private information comes into the model in the ﬁrst place,
meaning that individual decisions regarding the acquisition of information are ne-
glected. Furthermore, the very stylized model neglects the important aspect that
market prices in competitive markets may comprise disparate private information
and transmit this information to market participants.
In what follows, we will consider a modiﬁed model, where agents posses private
information regarding a payoff relevant variable but do also observe a market price
that transmits information. It will be ﬁrst shown that it is quite straightforward to
compute the T–map that governs the stability of adaptive learning processes even
in environments where such ’learning from prices’ takes place. Second, it will be
demonstrated, how this learning process can be modiﬁed to allow for an endoge-
nously determined amount of information acquisition during the learning process.
The central question then is, whether or not an endogenously determined amount of
information acquisition leads to stronger conditions for the stability of the learning
process.
3.1 The model
The model used here is a model of a competitive commodity market with privately
informed ﬁrms borrowed from Vives [1993]. Vives [1993] shows that it is possible
to restate the this model such that it can be interpreted as a ﬁnancial market model
where agents are buyers of an asset with unknown ex–post return similar to the
Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] model.
Here we stick to the commodity market interpretation of the model and assume
that there is a continuum of risk neutral ﬁrms in I = [0,1]. Market demand X for the





6Here, e is a normally distributed demand shock with zero mean and precision te.
b > 0 and f > 0 are known constants. Every ﬁrms faces increasing marginal costs
that are affected by the parameter q. With x(j) denoting the output of ﬁrm j, her
costs are c(j) = qx(j)+ 1
2
1
y x(j)2, where y > 0. The cost parameter q is unknown
to the ﬁrms. The ﬁrms, however, know that this parameter is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean ¯ q and precision t.
Firms have private information regarding the unknown parameter q. Regarding
this private information, we assume that the continuum of ﬁrms is divided into
n types of ﬁrms i = 1,...,n. Each type of ﬁrms has measure mi, where å
n
i=1 mi =
1, and all ﬁrms of the same type are homogeneous with respect to their private
information. A ﬁrm j of type i observes a private signal s(j)i that reveals additional
private information. The private signal is given by s(j)i ≡ si = q+ui, where the
signal’s noise ui is normally distributed with mean zero and precision tu,i. Thus, all
ﬁrms of the same type observe signals with the same precision, but precisions are
allowed to differ across ﬁrm types.
3.2 Rational expectations equilibrium
Proﬁt maximization on the side of the ﬁrms then implies that each ﬁrm’s optimal
output x(j)∗
i ≡ x∗
i is proportional to the difference between the market price p and
the conditional expectation of the unknown cost parameter q, where the respective
conditional expectation is based on the observed market price as well as the private
signal:
x∗
i = y (p−E[q|p, si])
Restricting attention to linear equilibria and using the fact that equilibrium de-
cisions of all ﬁrms of the same type are identical, we posit that the conditional
expectation of a ﬁrm of type i is a linear function of the market price and her private
signal:
E[q|p, si] = g0,i+g1,isi+g2,i p
This implies that a ﬁrm of type i uses a linear supply function according to which
xi = y(p−g0,i+g1,isi+g2,i p) and from this the market clearing price results as (here


















7A rational expectations equilibrium requires that the above described conditional
expectation is based on the joint equilibrium distribution of the unknown parameter,
the market price and the signals. Therefore let zi = (si− ¯ q,p− ¯ p)′, gi = (g1,i,g2,i)′ and






















Notice that Mzz,i and Mzq,i are identical for all ﬁrms of the same type. Given this,
the conditional expectation of q for a ﬁrm of type i can be computed as follows:
E[q|si, p] = ¯ q−Mzz,i(g)−1Mzq,i(g) ¯ z′
      
g0,i
+ Mzz,i(g)−1Mzq,i(g)




This expression again deﬁnes a T-map for all ﬁrm types i = 1,...,n (g0,i = ¯ q−
Ti(g)¯ z):
gi = Ti(g) = Mzz,i(g)−1Mzq,i(g)
Restricting attention to the parameters g1,i and g2,i of all type speciﬁc supply




















As usual, a rational expectations equilibrium deﬁned as a ﬁxed point of this
mapping. The coefﬁcients of the equilibrium supply schedules g∗ therefore solve
g∗ = T(g∗). Within the linear framework used here, existence and uniqueness of
such an equilibrium is guaranteed.
3.3 Stability under learning
An analysis of real time adaptive learning again requires to embed the static model
considered so far into a dynamic context. This is done here in the same way as
in the model considered in Section 2. Thus, we assume that the static model is
repeated over a long horizon, where in each period t an unobserved random variable
qt realizes. Firms observe their private signals si,t and decide on their optimal output
xi,t, where this decision is based on the expectation qe
i,t regarding the unknown qt
conditional on the actual market price pt:
xi,t = y[pt −qe
t]
1In Appendix A.4 we show that the dynamics of g0,i under learning give rise to no additional
stability conditions. Thus, it is of no harm to disregard this parameter in the subsequent analysis.
8The expectation qe
i,t in turn is based on an auxiliary model according to which qt =
g0,i +g1,isi,t +g2,i pt. At the end of each period t, ﬁrms observe the true value of qt
and then re–estimate the parameters of their auxiliary model using e.g. recursive
least squares.
As before, local stability of the rational expectations equilibrium g∗ under such
an adaptive learning scheme then requires that the rational expectations equilibrium
is E–stable, i.e. that g∗ is a locally stable stationary point of the ordinary differential






evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium g∗ are negative.
There are some general properties of the matrix T′(g) =
dT(g)
dg that prove to be
useful in the subsequent analysis. Let for all i = 1,...,n denote Ai the 2×2 matrix of
derivatives of Ti(g) with respect to gi. Furthermore, let Bij denote the 2×2 matrix of
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While, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the properties of the
matrices Ai and Bij, even this doesn’t facilitate the computation of the eigenvalues
of T′(g∗) in the fully heterogeneous case (n ﬁrm types of different measure that differ
with respect to the precision of their private information). For this reason, we now
look at two interesting special cases of this model, where it is possible to derive a
closed form solution for the eigenvalues of T′(g∗).
3.3.1 The Grossman–Stiglitz model
One important special case of the above described model is the case where there are
only two types of ﬁrms. Firms of the ﬁrst type are informed regarding q, whereas
ﬁrms of the second type have no private information at all. In this case, the model
becomes analytically identical to the model used by Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]
in their famous paper on the impossibility of informationally efﬁcient markets. The
question whether or not the rational expectations equilibrium of this model is stable
under learning has already been answered by Bray [1982] and Marcet and Sargent
[1992]. Here we brieﬂy reproduce the respective results demonstrating that these
results can be easily derived from the respective T–map.
9Thus, assume that n = 2 and that there is a mass 0 < m1 < 1 of informed ﬁrms
that observe a signal with precision tu,1 > 0, while the remaining ﬁrms (with mass
1−m1) are uninformed, i.e. their private signals have precision zero (tu,2 = 0).






2,1 = 0 (9a)
g′







The economic meaning of these equations is quite obvious: Since informed ﬁrms
cannot learn anything new from the observation of the market price p, their condi-
tional expectation regarding q is solely based on their private signals and unaffected
by uninformed ﬁrms’ actions. Uninformed ﬁrms, however, observe no private sig-
nals. So the best they can do is to extract some information regarding q from the
market price. The informational content of the market price in turn depends on the
weight g1,1 informed ﬁrms give to their private information and, thus, the weight
g2,2 they give to the market price depends on the informed ﬁrms’ actions.
Looking at the respective T-map, we then get that the matrix T′(g∗) takes a very
simple form in this case: Since uniformed ﬁrms’ actions cannot reveal any private
information, informed traders will not respond to the decisions of uninformed ﬁrms.
This implies that A1 and B12 are identical to zero. Thus, two of the 4 eigenvalues
of T′(g∗) are equal to zero while the other two are given by the eigenvalues of A2.
From (9b) we now get that one of the remaining two eigenvalues is also identical









1,1 > 0 all eigenvalues of T′(g∗) are always negative and so are
the eigenvalues of J(g∗), leading to the conclusion that the rational expectations
equilibrium of the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] model is always locally stable un-
der adaptive learning. This reproduces the respective stability result already derived
by Bray [1982] and Marcet and Sargent [1992] according to which recursive least
squares learning in the Grossman and Stiglitz model converges (locally) to the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium of this model:3
2Because tu,2 = 0 the T–map for the uninformed ﬁrms cannot be derived in the above described
way, since the moment matrix Mzz,i(g) is not well deﬁned in this case. For the derivation of equations
(9a) and (9b) see appendix A.2.
3Both papers also present instability results, according to which the rational expectations equilib-
rium of the Grossman and Stiglitz model might be unstable under learning. The potential instability
results from allowing for a correlation between the asset return and the random asset supply. With
103.3.2 Homogeneous ﬁrms
The above analysis has shown that the model with two types of ﬁrms where ﬁrms
of one type have no private information at all is in fact a special case as there is no
feedback from the learning process of uninformed ﬁrms to the actions of informed
ﬁrms. This poses the question, whether the above described stability result carries
over to a more general case of many partially informed ﬁrm types where ﬁrms of
each type try to learn to extract others’ information from prices and where such
feedback effects are present.
In order to answer this question, we now look at another special case of the
model, where ﬁrms are homogeneous with respect to the precision of their private
information but observe — dependent on their type — different private signals. We
assume that the precision of private information is identical for all ﬁrms, i.e. tu,i =tu,
and furthermore that mi = 1/n for all i = 1,...,n.
Due to symmetry, the matrix T′(g∗) again takes a very simple form in this case.
For all i = 1,...,n, we have Ai = A and Bij = B for all j  = i. In order to investigate
the properties of the model under adaptive learning, it is thus sufﬁcient to look at
the T–map Ti(g) for a ﬁrm of a representative type i. Some tedious algebra (see











































 2  (10b)
Based on equations (10a) and (10b) the following steps lead to the ﬁnal conclu-
sion that the rational expectations equilibrium g∗ is always E–stable:
1) For all i= 1,...,n, the matrix A of derivatives of Ti(g) with respect to gi is equal
to a(g) times the 2×2 identity matrix, i.e. A = a(g)I2, where from (10a) it
















respect to the model considered here, this would mean to allow for a positive correlation between the
unknown cost parameter q and the noise term affecting market demand e. Such a positive correlation
is ruled out in the present analysis.










thermore from (10b) it follows that b(g)22 = a(g).





      
(n−1)×
, a(g)−b(g)11,...,a(g)−b(g)11





4) In a rational expectations equilibrium with tu >0 we have a(g∗)<0. Moreover,
it can be shown (cf. Appendix A.5 for a proof) that a(g∗)−b(g∗)11 < 1 as well
as a(g∗)+(n−1)b(g∗)11 < 0. So, all eigenvalues of T′(g∗) are smaller than 1
and consequently, all eigenvalues of J(g∗) are always negative.
Thus, as in the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] model we again conclude that the
rational expectations equilibrium g∗ is always locally stable under adaptive learning.
A continuum of ﬁrms divided into n types that observe different signals regarding
an unknown cost parameter q is therefore able to learn (using e.g. least squares)
how much information of others is revealed through prices and will thus form ra-
tional expectations in the limit.4 The stability result derived by Bray [1982] and
Marcet and Sargent [1992] for the special case of the model with two types there-
fore in fact carries over to the more general setting with an arbitrary number of
partially informed ﬁrm types.
4 Endogenous acquisition of information
Up to now, the amount of private information was ﬁxed exogenously, leaving open
the question how this, perhaps costly information comes into the market in the ﬁrst
place. In order to answer this question, some additional assumptions regarding the
individual decision to acquire costly private information are necessary.
First of all, since it is easier to analyze smooth decisions, we disregard the model
of the Grossman and Stiglitz type here, because there each ﬁrm’s decision to acquire
information is dichotomous: They simply decide to acquire information with a given
precision or no information at all.5 Instead, it is assumed that each ﬁrm j is able to
4Since our stability concept is a local one, this is strictly speaking only true if the learning process
is in addition inhibited to leave the neighborhood of the REE.
5See Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] for an analysis of the decision to acquire information in this
case.
12acquire a signal s(j) with any desired precision t(j)u ≥0, where the cost of acquiring
that signal depends on its precision according to a cost function K(t(j)u). Regarding
this cost function it is assumed that K′(t(j)u) > 0 and K′′(t(j)u) ≥ 0, i.e. a more
precise signal induces higher information costs. To be able to refer to the analysis of
the preceding section it is also assumed that all ﬁrms of a given type behave perfectly
identical such that every ﬁrm j of type i acquires a signal si with precision tu,i. As
before, however, precisions of acquired signals are allowed to differ across ﬁrms of
different types.
Let us begin, again, with a static version of the model. Given linear decision rules
xi = y(p−g0,i−g1,isi−g2,i p) for all ﬁrm types i = 1,...,n, every ﬁrm has to decide
ex ante on the proﬁt maximizing amount of information. The optimal precision tu,i,
thus, balances the marginal costs of information acquisition for ﬁrm of type i with the
ex ante expected marginal revenue MR(tu,i). Computing ex ante expected proﬁt of







(cf. Appendix A.6 for details). Thus, the optimal precision acquired by a type i ﬁrm








It is neither guaranteed that the individually optimal amount of information
acquisition is positive nor that the rational expectations equilibrium entails a positive
amount of information acquisition of all ﬁrms.6 Among other things, this depends
on the nature of the marginal cost function at zero (i.e. K′(0)). For obvious reasons,
the following analysis is restricted to equilibria with a strictly positive amount of
information acquisition t∗
u > 0.
Given this optimal decision regarding information acquisition, we can now pro-
ceed with the analysis of learning. According to equation (12), each ﬁrm’s acquired
level of precision is a function h(g1,i) of the weight the ﬁrm will give to her private
information. If — as we have assumed — marginal costs of information acquisition
are nondecreasing, we have h′(g1,i) > 0, i.e. a ﬁrm that is going to put more weight
to her private information will also acquire a more precise signal.
The just described endogeneity of the precisions acquired by ﬁrms of different
types must be taken into account when we go on to analyze the T–map. Let ¯ tu =
(tu,1,...,tu,n) denote the vector of precisions acquired by ﬁrms of different types and
rewrite the T-map of the model with exogenously given precisions as g′ = T(g, ¯ tu).
The T–map of the model with endogenous acquisition of information is then given
by:
6See Verrecchia [1982] for a discussion of this issue in the context of the original
Grossman and Stiglitz model.
13g′ = T (g, h(g1,1),...,h(g1,n)) (13)
As usual, E–stability requires that all 2n eigenvalues of the matrix J(g) =
dT/dg−I2n evaluated at the REE g∗ are negative. Since ﬁrms are homogeneous with
respect to costs of information acquisition, the rational expectations equilibrium is
symmetric. Thus, as before in the case with exogenously given private information,
it is sufﬁcient to look at the T–map for a ﬁrm of a representative type i. The differ-




= A+h′(g1,i) ˆ A (14a)
¶Ti(g, h(g1,1),...,h(g1,n))
¶gj
= B+h′(g1,j) ˆ B (14b)
In equations (14a) and (14b) the matrices A and B are the same as in case of ex-
ogenously given private information and ˆ A and ˆ B are matrices that capture the now
appearing additional effect of endogenous information. Since ˆ A and ˆ B are matri-
ces whose second columns are made up of zeros, the eigenvalues of T′(g) can be ex-
pressed as follows: Let l1 =a(g∗)−b(g∗)11, l2 =na(g∗) and l3 =a(g∗)+(n−1)b(g∗)11
denote the three eigenvalues from the model with exogenously given information
which are in general different from zero (cf. equation (11)). Furthermore, let ˆ a∗
11
and ˆ b∗
11 denote the elements in the ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column of ˆ A and ˆ B, respectively,
evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium g∗ and let ﬁnally h′∗ denote the
derivative of h(g1) evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium. The eigenval-





















It is by no means obvious that the REE with endogenously acquired informed is
always stable under learning. In fact, while a formal proof that all eigenvalues are
smaller than 1 is possible, it is rather cumbersome. For this reason, we here present
only a proof for the special case of a large number of possible ﬁrm types, i.e. for the
case n →¥. In the following subsection we then present a numerical example which
at least provides some evidence that stability under learning also obtains in case of
a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types.
14In appendix A.7 it is shown that for n → ¥ the three nonzero eigenvalues l1,l2
and l3 of the model with exogenous information are given by










while the eigenvalues of the map T′(g∗,¯ t∗









, ˜ l2 = l2, ˜ l3 = l3+˜ l1
From the above analysis of the model with exogenous information we already
know that l2 < 0 and l3 < 0. Thus, all eigenvalues are less than one if ˜ l1 < 1.
This, however, is always the case since 2





1)2te < 1. Hence, the
rational expectations equilibrium is always E-stable if n → ¥. Notice that because
the eigenvalues are continuous functions of the number n of different ﬁrm types, this
implies that stability under learning also results whenever there is a large enough
number of different ﬁrm types.
Thus, the rational expectations equilibrium of this generalized version of the
Grossman and Stiglitz model where ﬁrms learn to extract others’ information from
market prices is not only always stable if private information is exogenous. It is
moreover also always stable under learning if information is endogenously acquired
and if marginal costs of information acquisition are non decreasing.
An illustrative example
In this subsection we present a numerical example of the above analyzed model with
a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types in order to illustrate some properties of the adaptive
learning process. By the way the respective simulation results provide at least some
weak evidence that stability under learning obtains irrespectively of the number of
ﬁrm types.
In this numerical example it is assumed that the costs of information acquisition
are given by the function K(tu) = dtk+1
u , with k > 0 and d> 0 such that the elasticity
of marginal costs of information acquisition with respect to tu is given by k > 0.
Two speciﬁcations of the model which differ with respect to k are considered:
The ﬁrst one assumes constant marginal costs of information acquisition, i.e. k = 0,
and d = 1 while the second one assumes k = 10, i.e. a large elasticity of marginal
costs of information acquisition. The parameter d in the second speciﬁcation is then
chosen in such a way that given all other parameters of the model the resulting
rational expectations equilibria in both speciﬁcations are identical. With respect
to these remaining parameters, we assume n = 5, te = 0.1, t = 0.1, b = 10, ¯ q = 1,
y = 2 and f = 0.4. The corresponding rational expectations equilibrium is then
characterized by g∗
0 = 0.9577, g∗
1 = 0.4594, g∗
2 = 0.5746 and t∗
u = 0.4594.
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Figure 1: Simulations of a learning process with k = 0 (red) and k = 10 (blue).
The simulations of the learning process are performed as follows: The process
starts with gi,0 for i = 1,...,n in a neighborhood of the rational expectations equi-
librium g∗. In a pre–learning period with a duration of 50 periods these initial
parameter vectors gi,0 are used to generate a data set that is used to initialize the
learning process. After that, ﬁrms learn from period to period, i.e. they estimate the
parameters of their auxiliary model using recursive least squares and decide on the
amount of information to be acquired based on these estimates.
The simulation results are depicted in ﬁgure 1. Each subﬁgure shows the time
paths of the respective variables for the different ﬁrm types (thin lines) and aver-
ages across all ﬁrm types (thick lines). The dotted lines in each subﬁgure indicate
the respective rational expectations equilibrium value. The main message of these
ﬁgures is that learning indeed seems to converge toward the rational expectations
equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the average of the acquired precision across ﬁrm types
ﬂuctuates more during the learning process if marginal costs of information acqui-
sition are constant. Moreover, the variance of the estimated parameters across ﬁrm
types is larger in this case. The simple reason for this is that lower marginal costs
of information acquisition induce stronger reactions of ﬁrms to the time varying ex-
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(b) Deviation of pt from REE price
Figure 2: Variance of g1,i and deviation of the market price from the REE price with
k = 0 (red) and k = 25 (blue).
pected marginal revenue of information acquisition. It is interesting to see, however,
that the average values of the estimated coefﬁcients of the ﬁrms’ auxiliary model are
more or less the same for both simulations during the learning process. Thus, with
respect to these average estimates it doesn’t matter much for the properties of the
learning process whether marginal costs of information acquisition are high or low.
Even though the means of the estimates across ﬁrm types differ not much in both
simulations, it turns out that the dispersion of these estimates is larger in case of
lower marginal costs of information acquisition. Thus, we should expect that this
greater dispersion also results in greater ﬂuctuations of the market price around its
respectice rational expectations equilibrium value during the learning process. This
is conﬁrmed by the evidence presented in ﬁgure 2.(a) which shows the variance
of the estimate of the parameter g1 across ﬁrm types for both speciﬁcations of the
model (the respective ﬁgures for the other two parameters give a quite similar pic-
ture). As can be seen, this variance decreases quite slowly and it is always larger in
the case where marginal costs of information acquisition are low. As a consequence
of this greater dispersion of the ﬁrms’ estimates the ﬂuctuations of the market price
are larger. This is shown in ﬁgure 2.(b) where for both speciﬁcations the deviations
of the market price from its respective rational expectations equilibrium value are
shown. As can be seen, even after a long period of learning price ﬂuctuations are
larger in case of lower marginal costs of information acquisition. Clearly, as the
learning process converges toward the rational expectations equilibrium, these ﬂuc-
tuations will become smaller and smaller. However, even from this only illustrative
example one gets the impression that the costs associated with the acquisition of
private information are relevant for the transient properties of a learning process
and that these costs will affect the duration of such a learning process.
175 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to demonstrate how the E–stability principle can be applied
to models with heterogeneous and private information in order to assess the stability
of rational expectations equilibria under learning. As was shown, it is possible to
derive the T–map that governs the properties of such learning processes in a quite
straightforward way from economic models with private information. With regard
to the linear model of the cobweb type considered in the ﬁrst part of the paper, the
analysis revealed that the presence of private information leads no further stability
conditions beyond those known from the case where private information is absent.
The analysis of a model of the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] type, where agents
try to extract from the market price private information of others, has shown
that it is not only possible to reproduce the stability results of Bray [1982] and
Marcet and Sargent [1992] in a quite simple way. Moreover, the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium in this kind of model turns out to be stable under learning even
in a more general setting with an arbitrary number of differentially informed ﬁrms.
Furthermore, stability under learning is conserved if the amount of private informa-
tion is endogenously determined by optimizing ﬁrms that decide on the amount of
privately acquired information. Thus, the fact that agents decide on the amount of
privately acquired information and are able to react to the information revealed by
market prices, doesn’t harm the stability properties of adaptive learning processes.
In this sense, the kind of rational expectations equilibria considered in models of the
Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] type appear to be quite robust.
References
M.M. Bray. Learning, estimation, and stability of rational expectations. Journal of
Economic Theory, 26:318–339, 1982.
G.W. Evans and S. Honkapohja. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics.
Princeton University Press, 2001.
S.J. Grossman and J. Stiglitz. On the impossibility of informationally efﬁcient mar-
kets. American Economic Review, 70:393–408, 1980.
R. Guesnerie. Assessing Rational Expectations 2: ‘Eductive’ Stability in Economics.
MIT–Press, Cambridge Mas, 2005.
A. Marcet and T. Sargent. The convergence of vector autoregressions to rational
expectations equilibrium. In A. Vercelli and N. Dimitri, editors, Macroeconomics:
Macroeconomics: A Survey of Research Strategies. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1992.
18A. Marcet and T.J. Sargent. The fate of systems with ‘adaptive’ expectations. Amer-
ican Economic Association – Papers and Proceedings, 78:168–172, 1988.
B. Routledge. Adaptive learning in ﬁnancial markets. Review of Financial Studies,
12:1165–1202, 1999.
R. Verrecchia. Information acquisition in a noisy rational expectations economy.
Econometrica, 50:1415–1430, 1982.
X. Vives. How fast do rational agents learn? Review of Economic Studies, 60:329–
347, 1993.
A Appendix
A.1 Asymptotic properties of the learning process
Here we show in a more detailed way that the T-map of the model described in
Section 2 can in fact be used to analyze the asymptotic properties of an adaptive
learning process based on a recursive least squares procedure.
Thus, assume that ﬁrms use recursive least squares to estimate the parameters
gi of their auxiliary model ye
t = g0,i+g1,isi,t. With gi = (g0,i,g1,i)′ for all i = 1,...,n, the
learning algorithm of a representative agent i can then be written as:


















The fundamental step is that the stochastic approximation tools described by
Evans and Honkapohja [2001], can be used to show that the asymptotic dynamics
of the learning algorithm are governed by an ODE, which is given as follows:












 −1 E[ziy]−gi (18)
Now, since z′
i,t = (1, si,t), the moments that appear in equation (18) depend
on g = (g1,...,gn)′ and coincide with the moments stated in equation (5). Thus,
(E[ziz′
i])
−1 E[ziy] = Ti(g) and the ODE (18) for a single agent i becomes:
˙ gi = Ti(g)−gi


















 ⇒ ˙ g = T(g)−g
19A.2 The T–map of the Grossman–Stiglitz model
The weight g′
1,1 informed ﬁrms will give to their private information is simply given
by the covariance between the signal si and the unknown cost parameter q divided





2,2 uninformed ﬁrms give to the market price is given by the covari-
ance between the market price p and the unknown cost parameter q divided by the




























A.3 The T–map with homogenous ﬁrms





































With respect to g′
1,i and g′









Substitution of the above stated expressions then results in equations (10a) and
(10b).
20A.4 The dynamics of the constant g0
In order to simplify the exposition, it is assumed that ¯ q = 0. Using the equations
(10a) and (10b), the respective equation g′























Evaluated at the REE g∗, the derivative of g′
0,i with respect to g0,i equals a(g∗),
while the derivatives with respect to g1,i and g2,i are zero. Moreover, the derivatives
of g′
0,i with respect to g0,j also equal a(g∗) while the derivatives with respect to g2,j
equal zero. Taking into account the special structure of the respective Jacobian, it
then follows that the eigenvalues of the overall T–map including the constant g0,i for
all i = 1,...,n are the same as the eigenvalues of T(g∗).
A.5 Eigenvalues of the T–map at the REE
In a REE with identical precisions tu for all ﬁrm types i = 1,...,n we have g1,i = g∗
1

























Since a(g∗) is always negative, the eigenvalue equal to na(g∗) is also always
negative.
Thus, we proceed with the remaining eigenvalues equal to a(g∗)−b(g∗)11 and











We next show that b(g∗)11 is always negative such that the eigenvalue a(g∗)+(n−
1)b(g∗)11 is negative too. The proof is a little bit awkward since it requires to assess
the REE value g∗
1 of the coefﬁcient g1. From (19) it is quite obvious that g∗
1 < tu
t+tu. A
lower bound for g∗




21The function f(g1) increases monotonically with f′′ > 0. Therefore the root ˜ g1 of the
equation g1 f′(g∗
1) = n2t2
u is positive and smaller than the unique positive root g∗
1 of
(19), i.e.:














Now, b(g∗)11 <0 requires 1−2g∗
1
t+ntu
tu < 0 and since ˜ g1 <g∗





















The last inequality is always satisﬁed because g∗
1 < tu
t+tu. Thus, we have b(g∗)11 <0
and the eigenvalue equal to a(g∗)+(n−1)b(g∗)11 is necessarily negative.
Notice that b(g∗)11 < 0 doesn’t rule out that the remaining n−1 eigenvalues that
equal a(g∗)−b(g∗)11 are positive. However, E–stability obtains, whenever a(g∗)−



























The right hand side of this inequality is negative. The left hand side is always
positive, which is obvious if n ≥ 3 but also holds in case n = 2, since g∗ < tu
t+tu.
Thus, all eigenvalues of T′(g∗) are always either negative or smaller than one
such that the REE is always E–stable.
A.6 Optimal information acquisition






























where xi = y(1−g2,i)p−g0,0 −g1,isi. Notice, that we consider here decisions of a
single ﬁrm which is of measure zero. Thus, the decision of a single ﬁrm will not
alter the variance of the market price or the covariance between the market price
























A.7 Stability under learning with endogenous information and n → ¥
The stability analysis simpliﬁes considerably, if we look at the special case n → ¥.

















Thus, in the model with exogenous information we have l1 = 0 while l2 and l3
are given by equations (25) and (26), respectively.
The relevant elements ˆ a∗
11 and ˆ b∗
11 from the matrices ˆ A and ˆ B can be computed

















Equations (27) and (28) imply that limn→¥ ˆ b∗











Taking into account the vector of the eigenvalues of T′(g∗) as stated in (15), we
can therefore conclude that the nonzero eigenvalues are given by:






, ˜ l2 = l2, ˜ l3 = l3+˜ l1 (30)













We have to look at the REE with an identical optimal precision t∗
u for ﬁrms of
all types and identical weights g∗





u) ≥ 0 denoting the elasticity of
marginal costs of information acquisition with respect to the precision tu evaluated
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